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During one generation life-span Polish society experienced two com-
plete changes of social order:
– the post-war system transformation which resulted in the shaping 
of a  socio-political system defined as real socialism and lasting for half 
a century,
– system transformation initiated on the break of the 21st century and 
lasting to the present moment with a view to formation of a sociopolitical 
system defined as democratic capitalism.
The post-war rejection of capitalism as a system based on exploitation 
and social injustice led, 50 years later, to the restitution of the system now 
claimed to be the best or the only possible one.
A  system transformation is defined as a  social change that leads to 
qualitative reshaping of a social order. Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński (1999) dis-
tinguishes three types of such a social change depending on the pace of its 
progression: gradual, radical, and mixed. The first one occurs in case of 
a consistent, usually long-lasting replacement of the old system elements 
with the new ones which are characteristic for the emerging social order. 
The second one ensues when all elements of the old order are exchanged 
simultaneously and violently. The “mixed” type comes about when “the key 
elements of the old order are in an abrupt manner replaced with some new 
elements. This, in consequence, paves the way for more gradual changes 
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(reforms) of less important components of the old social order” (Wnuk-Li-
piński, 1999, p. 23).
Depending on the initiator of the change and on the presence or lack 
of violence, the  same author distinguishes an evolutionary, reformatory, 
and revolutionary manner of its implementation. A gradual, spontaneous 
social change takes place in an evolutionary manner. When the governing 
elite initiates the change, it is referred to as a “reform”. If the transforma-
tion is accompanied by violence, it is defined as “revolution”.
The change of the social order in Poland after World War II was revo-
lutionary and took place in the circumstances of civil war. Violent measures 
were applied against opponents of socialist regime. As a result of the Yalta 
Treaty establishing new order in the post-war Europe, Poland found itself 
in the Soviet sphere of influence, which was an important determining fac-
tor for the emergence of the socio-political system shaped here in the fol-
lowing years. Although it was a decisive influence, another fact was also 
important: the  socialist ideology that emphasised values of equality and 
social justice found followers not only among the formerly underprivileged 
classes, but also among the intelligentsia of the time. As Paweł Machonin 
(1999) states, the  clue to the  success of Marxist ideology success lies in 
the fact that it heralded and already contained some aspects of modernisa-
tion of society. It was especially significant in countries such as Poland that 
had to face the task of launching the first stage of extensive industrialisation 
and urbanisation. As the author points out: “the communist regimes in fact 
stimulated some cultural changes important for modernisation, and in cer-
tain aspects favourable for the population. Beside the relative technological 
progress in the production of goods and the basic consumption standards 
(including some improvement in housing conditions), a doubtless educa-
tional expansion also needs to be mentioned” (Machonin, 1999, p. 50).
The socialist system in Poland had features common to all the coun-
tries of the socialist bloc and, in addition, a few unique traits distinguishing 
the Polish variety of socialism.
The main common features were:
– in the realm of politics: monopolisation of legal power by a single 
political party (in Poland it was even guaranteed by the Constitution),
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– in the realm of economy: the policy of central planning as a regula-
tor of economy based on state ownership of production means,
– in the realm of ideology: adoption of Marxism-Leninism as the of-
ficial national ideology.
Nevertheless, except for the Stalinist period of the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the political system in Poland did not possess any features of total-
itarian regime.1
The main distinguishing features of Polish socialism were:
– existence of private ownership of production means in agriculture, 
trade, and services,
– considerable independence of the Catholic Church which through-
out the post-war era promoted the ideology opposed to Marxism-Leninism 
and in the 1980s became an institution offering support for the opposition 
movement,
– more frequent than elsewhere outbursts of social discontent (1956, 
1968, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1988) leading to emergence in 1976 of an of-
ficial, although illegal, opposition movement and to formation in 1980 
of “Solidarity”, an independent trade union, which fact was a significant 
disturbance for the party monopoly.
The fact that socialist system in Poland was constantly “in the throes 
of change” makes it difficult to define the exact moment when the second 
transformation began. Undoubtedly, the parliamentary elections of 1989 
and formation of the first non-communist government in September of 
that year contributed substantially to the precipitation of the social change 
and gave it a new quality. However, some researchers (Poznański, 1996) 
locate the  starting point of the  transformation as early as in the  1970s. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that in Poland we experienced at first a grad-
ual social change within the limits of socialist order and then a radical shift 
as the non-communist parties took over the power. Some researchers, es-
pecially those from the countries of the former communist bloc, stress that 
the reasons of the transformation – resulting in the downfall of socialism 
– are to be found as much in the external relations as in the internal ones.
1 According to Frances Millard (1999), this was due to some particularities of Polish 
socialism described by the author as “a system constantly in the throes of change” (p. 7).
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As Witold Morawski (1999) points out – quoting other recognised ex-
perts in the  field – no system change would have been possible if it had 
not been for the failure of the socialist system in the military, economic and 
cultural competition with the Western civilisation. Paweł Machonin (1999, 
p. 50) states that the collapse of socialism was a consequence of the fact that 
even the most advanced European socialist countries “were not successful in 
starting the post-industrial developments”. Władysław Adamski (1999), in 
turn, disagreeing with those authors who place the reasons of the systemic 
change exclusively outside given society, claims that “neither the totalitari-
an or quasi-totalitarian system of power as such, nor even the depth of its 
communist or socialist ideology implementation, but rather its inner con-
tradictions, stemming from the historical uniqueness of the social structures 
‘designed’ by  this system, deserve to be taken as decisive factors responsi-
ble for the system collapse and the trajectories of the ongoing processes of 
the ‘post-socialist’ transformation” (Adamski, 1999, p. 62). According to Ad-
amski, the most destructive factor for the Polish socialist system – especially 
for the manner of its ideological implementation – was the emergence, in pe-
culiar demographic conditions, of a common sphere of interests for the “new 
working class” and the  “proletarised” intelligentsia. Actually, the historical 
changes were instigated by the post-war generation of baby boomers, a social 
group that was fairly significant within the demographic structure of Polish 
society, relatively well-educated and aspiring to higher goals than career paths 
offered by the socialist system (Adamski, 1999). The research of Wielisława 
Warzywoda-Kruszyńska (1985) indicates that prior to the  “Solidarity” era 
two parallel structural principles existed within the Polish society: one, rep-
resentative for the older generation, was based on the principle of consitance 
of social status characteristics; the other, typical for the young adults, relied 
on the principle of decomposition of the status characteristics. That state of 
affairs led to a deep sense of deprivation among young people who supported 
“Solidarity” in their masses thus contributing to the  important change in 
the system of articulation of social goals and, in consequence, to the collapse 
of the socialist rule. In the late 1980s, after the national amnesty of Septem-
ber 1986, many politically innovative institutions were created, e.g. The civil 
rights spokesman office, the State Tribunal, referendum. All of them contrib-
uted the transformation of the Polish political infrastructure.
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In the field of economy, the 1980s brought about a rapid increase in 
the number and importance of private enterprises, both legal ones as well as 
those operating within black market. Combined with the already existing 
private sector, this led to an expansion of market relations. The first signifi-
cant move towards market economy was made by the government of Prime 
Minister Mieczysław Rakowski that, in summer of 1989, “liberated” prices 
in agriculture, i.e. introduced market mechanisms of shaping prices of farm 
products, which fact caused a wave of hyperinflation.
Following the  strikes of 1988, the government and “Solidarity” trade 
union signed in April 1989 the  Round Table agreement that led to elec-
tions for the Sejm and the Senate in June 1989. The formation of the first 
non-communist government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki spurred a process of rad-
ical social change not only in Poland but also in the whole “Eastern bloc”.
The collapse of socialism surprised both politicians and scholars. No 
scientific theory existed hitherto that would explain this unprecedented 
event. Analogies were searched for in other countries and continents. Many 
researchers claimed that there was nothing special about the processes tak-
ing place in Central Europe and that one should treat them as part of 
“the  wave of democratisation initiated in Portugal in 1974” (Di Palma 
1993, cited after Adamski 1999, p.59) or, as Samuel Huntington (1993) 
stated, as the third wave of democratisation (following the Latin American 
and the Southern European ones). The concept of transition to democracy 
seemed to be clear, well grounded and easily applicable. Its assumptions 
appeared attractive as they pertained to a  clearly defined objective – re-
placement of an authoritarian regime with a democratic system. Similar-
ly convincing seemed the  idea of an ostensibly uniform and linear path 
leading all countries of the Eastern bloc to the achievement of this objec-
tive. It took time to learn that transition from socialism to democracy was 
a unique process and each country was about to engage in its own specific 
kind of transformation. The main difference between the Central European 
model when compared to the Latin American and South European ones, is 
that in case of the latter the transition to democracy took place in the con-
text of long existing market economy and in the presence of competing 
political elites that accepted common values and acting principles. In Cen-
tral Europe democracy is built simultaneously with market economy while 
many countries of the region lack any experienced political elite. Therefore, 
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the system transformation turns out to be very complex and its outcome 
is hard to predict as qualitative changes occur simultaneously in politics, 
economy and society. Additionally, the process is taking place in conditions 
of international competition enhanced by strong globalisation tendencies.
The decision to introduce democracy marked not a final, but a starting 
point for the tasks to be performed in the post-socialist countries. Frances 
Millard (1999) points to five such vital tasks:
1. Introduction of new principles for the functioning of institutions, 
principles based on law and respect for the rights of Minorities. It requires 
creation of qualitatively new relations between the legislative, executive and 
judicial authorities as well as formation of new institutions designed to 
mediate between the people and the  state. New mechanisms to regulate 
responsibilities of state institutions toward its citizens are needed too.
2. Elimination of institutions of central planning and price fixing; im-
plementation and assurance of the right to private ownership; introduction 
of a tax system and other financial regulations typical of market economy.
3. Implementation of all necessary transformations in the  social 
structure and in the system of social security. The necessary social changes 
should lead to establishment of a middle class, transformation of peasant-
ry into a farming class and formation of “a class of service professionals”. 
The burden of social security must be transferred from work provider to 
specialised institutions whose existence will be indispensable in the context 
of new forms of social inequality. The Church and other organisations must 
engage once again in their traditional social practices.
4. Modification of political culture leading to the  development of 
a civil society. It is a long lasting and complex process accompanied by un-
avoidable contradictions that must be resolved.
5. Introduction of new trade relations in response to the  ongoing 
global integration processes; membership in the agencies of international 
economic/monetary systems and in the new defence institutions.
Nikolai Genov (1999), while pointing out that along with political, 
economic and cultural reconstruction also technological reorganisation 
takes place in the post-communist countries, presents the following outline 
of the four dimensions of the Central European system transformation and 
its possible effects:
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Table 1
Four dimensions of the Central European system transformation 
and its possible effects
Dimension Task Potential effect
Technological reorganisation Computerisation Adaptation to globalinformation technologies
Economic reorganisation Free market expansion Adaptation to global markets
Political reorganisation Democratisation Adaptation to globalrationalisation of politics
Cultural reorganisation Openness to universal trends
Adaptation to global innovations 
in the field of culture
Source: Genov, N. (1999). Managing Transformations in Eastern Europe. Paris, Sofia: 
UNESCO-MOST, p. 22.
The  complex situation in the  countries of East-Central Europe is 
caused not only by simultaneous yet differently paced transformations in 
many dimensions of social life. It is also due to the fact that the change is 
realised on various levels: it affects people (individual and collective ac-
tors), organisations and institutions – each at a different speed and time. 
As Andrzej Rychard (1995, p. 27) states: “… ‘old’ actors often function in 
newly emerged organisations, whereas new institutional regulations some-
times do not find their organisational projection so they have to be applied 
by individual actors. In this case it often happens that ‘new’ actors func-
tion in old organisations”. According to Rychard we are dealing with de-
composition of the process of transformation manifested by differences in 
the logic of functioning and rationality of each of the elements of the triad 
(people, organisations and institutions) as well as by a different degree of 
their ‘transformational advancement’.
In result, system transformation involves emergence of new social ac-
tors and elimination of the old ones. It is accompanied by creation of new 
social relations and decline of the former ones. The new actors are primarily 
private entrepreneurs, public functionaries liable to democratic procedures, 
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and structures of the civil society developed out of new forms of social and 
economic organisations. The emergence of these leads, in turn, to problems 
of convergence and divergence of individual and organisational interests 
and creates a need to keep the balance between the interests of national and 
foreign institutions.
The process of forming new social relations manifests itself in the shift of 
the weight from distribution of political power to economic reproduction and 
from hierarchic relationships to relationships based on voluntary membership 
(associations). As Genov (1999) points out, there is no doubt that transfor-
mation inspires a great variety of co-ordination and conflict relations that arise 
both from the existing hierarchy and from the negotiated polyarchy.2
The  emergence of new actors and relations is a  process that brings 
about various expectations, aspirations, actions, and results. Some tensions 
appear between long and short term objectives, i.e. Those that have only 
local importance and affect some specific groups or communities – and 
those of regional (continental) or global range. Starting with “components” 
of the transformation process, Genov (1999) constructs the following op-
erational scheme:
Table 2
Operational scheme of the transformation process
Dimension Tasks Effects
Actors Initiative and responsibility Competitiveness
Relations Maintaining the balance between
hierarchy and polyarchy
Meritocracy
Processes Effective allocation or resources Innovative character of the system
Source: Genov, N. (1999). Managing Transformations in Eastern Europe. Paris, Sofia: 
UNESCO-MOST, p. 24.
2 Polyarchy – the term describing relationships between different partners (e.g. insti-
tutions, organizations, individuals) where each partner shares the same amount of power.
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While claiming that the system transformation is a historical form of 
Central Europe’s adaptation to global trends, the author states that the in-
corporation of this region into the  “global village” requires competitive 
actors, social relations based on knowledge, and effective allocation of re-
sources that will make the system innovative.
According to Genov, the  common feature of social transformations 
in the  countries of Eastern Europe countries is the  resulting transfer of 
institutional patterns that have already proved effective in other industrial 
societies. This transfer applies basically to four types of orientations and re-
lated institutional structures which include the main tendencies in the de-
velopment of modern societies, namely:
– instrumentalisation of values,
– individualisation,
– organisational rationality,
– universalisation of the system of values.
These trends permeate all contemporary societies though with differ-
ing intensity and to varying extent. They percolate through such channels 
as global transfer of technologies, commercial and financial transactions of 
world-wide scope, transnational political processes and diffusion of cultural 
patterns via telecommunication media.
Instrumental values (effectiveness, productivity) constitute vital forces 
of modern production and economic exchange. They invigorate political 
systems based on competition and contribute to entrepreneurial culture 
and dependability. They have dominated all spheres of life in advanced 
societies and are in the centre of their “secularised religion”. Acting in ac-
cordance with these values, the West has managed to ensure its domination 
over the  rest of the world. That is why the driving forces and effects of 
the instrumentalisation of actions are now at the heart of the problems that 
stimulate but also plague modern civilisation.
Individualisation, i.e. widening the  range of possibilities of an indi-
vidual’s development and self-realisation is an evolutionary trend gradual-
ly encompassing new areas of the globe. Innovations in market economy, 
policy based on competition, and a  pluralistic culture have made indi-
vidualisation a  fundamental feature of social development in advanced 
industrial societies. However, the increasing autonomy of individuals has 
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some implications such as anomie (breakdown of social norms) leading to 
various forms of disorientation and deviation accompanied by pathologies 
of organisations. Despite all the  uncertainties and responsibilities which 
the individualisation places upon an individual, it is believed to be one of 
primary values in advanced societies. It is so, because industrial societies 
have developed effective institutions and organisations designed to reduce 
these uncertainties. Thus the  tendency of individualisation springs from 
the motives related to the system of values as well as from the support pro-
vided by a great variety of organisations that reduce the uncertainty ‘from 
the cradle to the grave’ and help an individual to cope with life risks.
Another global trend determining developments in Eastern Europe 
is modernisation of organisational rationality, i.e. Diversification of social 
structures and their functions combined with strengthening of social inte-
gration. In modern societies both tasks are realised mainly by official or-
ganisations which originated in Western Europe. Undoubtedly, the wave 
of democratisation in Eastern Europe is a historically significant example 
of modernisation of rationality in organisational structures and processes, 
including the state itself.
Over the  last decades the global civilisation has experienced a  rapid 
universalisation of the system of values. While this tendency was initiated 
and effectively enhanced by  the  electronic media, its deeper causes have 
their root in the  dissemination of universal technological standards, in 
the globalisation of economy, in global political interdependence, and in 
the globalisation of culture and lifestyles. Without doubt, the same techno-
logical problems brought forth by identical technologies eventually create 
and support the same cultural patterns of problem solving.
The universality of new orientations and values provokes a collective 
cultural trauma (Sztompka, 2002). The post-socialist breakthrough brings 
about disintegration of the existing culture (values, norms, canons, ideals). 
At institutional level, this causes disorganisation and at the level of person-
ality, cultural disorientation, that is “uncertainty about the appropriate pat-
terns of conduct and a sense of ‘incompetence in civilisation’ understood as 
the lack of habits necessary to make use of the newly created institutions” 
(Sztompka, 2002, p. 461). 
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Each country of Central Europe realises its own unique system trans-
formation stemming from the country’s cultural background, the manner 
of rejecting the socialist system, and from external circumstances.
Polish model of transformation is closely linked with the  creation 
of a unique institution of the Round Table (later repeated in Hungary). 
In April 1989, representatives of the  socialist government and opposi-
tion jointly adopted a number of resolutions that considerably influenced 
the  subsequent events. The  Round Table agreement legalised “Solidari-
ty” trade union.3 The  agreement introduced a  four-year transition peri-
od (one term of office of the Sejm) during which the opposition was to 
learn the parliamentary ways and the communist party was to prepare itself 
for participation in the free elections. The second parliamentary chamber 
established then, the Senate, was to be elected straightaway in fully free 
elections. Elections to the Sejm were also free but only partially based on 
competition so as to secure the Majority for the communist party members. 
The Round Table established the office of the President chosen by both 
parliamentary chambers. It also instituted the independence of courts and 
freedom of mass media. In the June 1989 elections, however, the deputies 
from the communist party obtained only 38% of votes. The Prime Minis-
ter appointed by the President wasn’t able to form a government. The Presi-
dent thus decided to entrust the mission to an opposition member, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, who led the coalition composed of parties with “Solidarity” 
background as well as some representatives of the communist party and its 
two satellite parties. The Communist members of the government super-
vised the Ministry of Defence and the ministry of Home Affairs. The So-
viet army was still stationed on Polish territory and the reaction of USSR 
to the  political changes in Poland was not entirely known at the  time. 
When Michaił Gorbaczow accepted the result of Polish elections, it became 
clear that the Soviet Union did not intend any form of intervention. This 
opened way for further changes. Leszek Balcerowicz, the author of the so-
called shock therapy, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of Finance. Poland entered the path of economic transformation in a very 
3 The union was legalised once in 1980 and delegalised soon by the decree of the mar-
tial law in December 1981.
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poor economic condition. In 1979, for the first time in the post-war Pol-
ish history, there was a decrease of production and domestic product that 
dwindled to the level from the beginning of the 1970s. Although this de-
crease of GDP was halted throughout the 1980s, the year 1989 brought 
a new crisis. There were shortages of goods and services on the market. 
Prices went up. In the autumn of 1989 hyperinflation came, caused by an 
introduction of market prices for agricultural products and by indexing of 
wages guaranteed in the Round Table agreements. Growing foreign debt 
made the situation even worse. In such circumstances, on 1 January 1990 
the Balcerowicz Plan was introduced. Its aim was to stabilise the economy 
and to make structural changes in its functioning. The Plan is still a con-
troversial issue. Its supporters believe that it contributed to faster economic 
growth and made the transformation successful; the opponents claim that 
by way of indiscriminate implementation of neo-liberal conception that fa-
voured private ownership and an ‘invisible hand of the market’ as a mecha-
nism of economic regulation, the Plan led to the collapse of state-run firms 
and thus contributed to the sale of national property and to uncontrolled 
unemployment.
The basic element of Balcerowicz’s strategy was lifting of state control 
over prices, i.e. Their fixing according to supply and demand fluctuations. 
This liberalisation of prices was to be counterbalanced by another element 
of the  strategy: opening of the  consumer market to foreign products. 
A  similar function was ascribed to the  elimination of state subventions 
for consumer goods. Simultaneously, real (inflation dependent) interest 
rates were introduced for bank loans, which was a shattering blow for busi-
nesses and people who started to modernise their firms in the 1980s. It 
also caused huge obstructions of payments and ruined many enterprises. 
Unemployment became a  traumatic experience for Polish society. Intro-
duction of market economy rules according to the Balcerowicz Plan caused 
the real abolition of the principle of full employment that constituted one 
of the main characteristics of the socialist society. Already in the spring of 
1990, there were 400 000 unemployed registered and their number tripled 
by the end of that year. The deterioration of living standards also stemmed 
from the lowering of real income, which in turn resulted in a decrease of 
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consumption demand. Although black market and long queues in shops 
disappeared, hardly anybody felt any improvement of living conditions.
The governmental strategy encountered resistance from both workers 
and managing staff. The uncertainty caused by high inflation rate, the in-
accessibility of bank credits, and the  lack of clear rules of privatisation 
enhanced “wait-andsee” attitudes in enterprises. A  sense of disappoint-
ment about the economic policy of the government led to social protests 
and strikes. The process of privatisation of big industrial concerns faced 
great difficulties, mainly in the heavy industry sector where trade unions 
were particularly strong. Smaller enterprises were privatised very quick-
ly and often fell into the hands of nomenklatura (former party officials). 
The first victims of market reforms were workers who had done so much 
to overthrow socialism in Poland. Their enormous disappointment found 
its outlet in the results of the September 1993 elections when a coalition 
of post-communist parties took over the power after a  three-year rule of 
changing governments with Solidarity background. However, socialism 
was not restored. The direction of economic change set by the Balcerowicz 
Plan proved to be decisive for the further development of the country. Cor-
rections introduced by subsequent governments could not and did not alter 
the basic outline of economic policy implemented in 1990.
Although the advancement of market economy in Poland seems irre-
versible, privatisation of the biggest enterprises such as mines, railways, and 
steelworks has not been completed yet. Solutions proposed by consecutive 
governments did not gain the acceptance of trade unions. Since the en-
terprises in question incur deficit, they generate losses and thus influence 
significantly the state of public finances.
The “decommunisation” programme adopted by “Solidarity” encom-
passed not only limiting the state intervention in economy but also in ad-
ministration and social work. The idea of creating a local self-government 
(gminy) was brought into life as early as 1990. Further changes in the state 
administration system came nine years later, when the coalition of post-Sol-
idarity parties regained power. Currently, three levels of self-government 
exist independently of each other: a commune (gmina), a district (powiat) 
and a province (województwo). In provinces, the  state authority is repre-
sented by the office of wojewoda. Each of the self-government levels has its 
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own responsibilities. For example, communes are in charge of nurseries, 
primary schools and grammar schools (gimnazja), districts run secondary 
schools while self-governments of provinces are responsible for institutions 
of high schools. The process of creation of local self-government was based 
on the principle of subsidiarity which requires that social needs be satisfied 
by institutions “close” to the people. The emergence of self-government was 
accompanied by controversies about the number of particular administra-
tion units and the range of their competencies.
Even though the  decentralisation of the  state is an irreversible fact, 
the  manner of financing self-governments remains an unresolved issue. 
The decentralisation of responsibilities did not come along with decentrali-
sation of public finances. Neither the post-Solidarity government which was 
in power when the local self-government was constituted nor the next one 
has decided to give the local authorities some share in taxes so the financing 
is performed basically through grants and subsidies from the central budget. 
Such state of affairs causes constant shortage of means and – what is even 
more important with regard to local political elites – some problems with 
the shaping a sense of responsibility for the tasks assigned to each of the local 
authority levels. It primarily applies to the fight unemployment, poverty and 
social exclusion, to health protection, education, housing etc.
The central government claims that decentralisation of public finances 
is impossible as yet because of the so-called stiff budget expenses which are 
too high at the moment. These expenses result from the statutory obliga-
tions of the state toward its nationals and institutions. For example the state 
budget covers invalid and eldery pensions, social care allowances, education 
expenses, unemployment benefits  etc. Sick-benefits and pensions consti-
tute a considerable part of the central budget expenditure. Although Po-
land is a country with a lower percentage of senior citizens than countries 
of Western Europe, which should have a positive influence on the general 
state of health, it turns out that the number of people entitled to inva-
lid pension is bigger than in Germany. This situation is related to the fact 
that neither the first post-communist government nor the succeeding ones 
conceived a method of dealing with unemployment which grew rapidly in 
years 1990–1993 and ranged from 6.6% to 16.4% affecting over 3 mil-
lion employable people. Among the methods applied to protect the popu-
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lation’s income and to lower the unemployment rate were liberalisation of 
applicability criteria for invalid pension and promotion of early retirement 
amidst employees of the firms threatened with bankruptcy. This solution 
was advantageous for enterprises since it did not oblige them to pay com-
pensations that would be due in the case of collective layoffs; it seemed to 
be beneficial for the individuals as well since it assured a steady income and 
did not stigmatise them as unemployed.
Agricultural population also receives pensions covered in 95% from 
the state budget. Representatives of some professions (e.g. policemen, mili-
taries, employees of judicial system) do  not pay insurance premiums at 
all and yet they are entitled to receive pensions; others acquire retirement 
benefits after a shorter period of employment than ‘ordinary’ employees. 
Attempts to regulate the system of pension granting have not been entirely 
successful because retirement privileges are strongly defended by political 
parties and trade unions. In 1999, however, the reform of the retirement 
insurance system was introduced. It is based on three pillars: a  compul-
sory insurance, a  collective insurance in retirement funds, and a  private 
insurance. The  most advanced in age employees will receive their pen-
sions according to the rules binding before the reform whereas the young-
est workers are additionally obliged to choose a retirement fund. Besides, 
everybody has a right to buy a private insurance policy. The system is rel-
atively new and its effectiveness will be evaluated in the future. The issue 
of insurance for agricultural population has not been solved, which leads 
to frequent abuses as it is enough to possess only one-hectare of land to be 
entitled to membership in the agricultural insurance fund financed in 95% 
from the state budget.
During the first ten years of transformation over 5 million employable 
people drifted from the sphere of domestic product creation to the sphere 
of redistribution and social care; about a half of this group retired or ap-
plied for invalid pension (2.8 milion) and the  rest became unemployed 
(Kabaj, 2000).
The unemployment rate that rose successively until 1993 (16.4%) de-
clined in the following years to reach the rate of 10.5% in 1997, only to in-
crease again up to 18.7%, which amounts to nearly 3.3 million unemployed 
in 2002. High unemployment rate and poverty are definitely the greatest 
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social issues in Poland. The unemployment is chronic and long lasting and, 
what is extremely significant, no effective social aid is provided. Only one 
in five of the unemployed is entitled to unemployment benefits. The rest 
are maintained by  their families and receive some meagre support from 
the  social assistance system. They often work illegally when their health 
or circumstances permit it. Some engage in criminal activities. The unem-
ployment rate is higher among women; the  problem affects more often 
young people who enter the age of procreation and matrimony rather than 
the older ones. The  fact that young population leaving schools (recently 
the  institutions of higher education as well) is not able to find work is 
particularly alarming. Entering the  adulthood without any possibility of 
achieving self-reliance has a negative impact on marriage and procreation 
plans and lengthens the period of dependence on parents. The unemploy-
ment among the young would be even higher if were not for the prolifer-
ation of nonpublic post-secondary schools which operate on commercial 
terms. They have become a sort of depositories for the young people whose 
parents can afford to pay tuition fees and other costs related to studying. 
Even though some of these schools do offer education services of acceptable 
quality, many are merely selling illusions that their graduates will find jobs 
more easily. Only until recently a college diploma was bound to ensure one 
a job. Nowadays, even graduates of recognised Polish universities have dif-
ficulty finding work since no vacant positions are available. They have been 
taken by slightly older (and luckier) colleagues. Fairly recently a number 
of Poles of different professions started to search for jobs in EU Countries.
High unemployment is caused by scarcity of available jobs (the net job 
loss rate is estimated by mieczysław Kabaj at 1.7 million), by mismatch of 
qualifications versus demands of the  job market, and by low mobility of 
workforce in Poland. In addition, the workforce is distributed quite irreg-
ularly across the country.
The persistence of unemployment in the first place, but also the re-
muneration policy which limits employees’ pays while rising salaries of 
the managing staff enhanced the income inequalities in Poland.4 The Gini’s 
4 Daily newspapers in Poland often mention the problems of disproportionately high 
earnings of managers in state enterprises that are in the process of bankruptcy or incur deficit.
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coefficient rose from 0.28 to 0.33 reaching higher value than in the Scan-
dinavian countries.5 Many Polish families are experiencing poverty. It is 
estimated to affect 6.5 million people living in households with income per 
capita lower than 50% of the average national wage. Within the population 
of the poor there is an overrepresentation of children and young people, 
which validates a  claim that Poland experiences a phenomenon of juve-
nalisation of poverty. Children and adolescents under 18 years of age con-
stitute 24% of overall Polish population but as much as 44% of the poor. 
The poverty rate among children (29.5%) is almost twice as high as among 
the population in general (16.2%). Unfortunately, neither the government 
nor the opposition has come up with a feasible program of combating un-
employment and poverty. In fact, the measures proposed so far are limited 
to some attempts to reduce the  public social expenditure and recurring 
proposals to lower taxes. The conviction that lower taxes will automatical-
ly increase the number of jobs is rather disputable. Poland’s accession to 
the European Union and the necessity to submit regular reports on em-
ployment and the range of poverty will at least evoke a common dispute 
about the strategy for improvement of living standards, the improvement 
that should strengthen the effectiveness of Polish economy.
When spectacular achievements such as accession to the NATO or to 
the EU are set aside and one measures the results of system transformation 
according to welfare of the population, the image of Polish achievements of 
the first decade is not so obvious as it would have seemed just a few years 
ago. The political division into post-communist and post-Solidarity camps 
has not been eradicated, which makes it difficult to find common prior-
ities and realise them consistently. While politics is the key to economic 
transformation, it should take into account the fate of ordinary people who 
become overshadowed by macroeconomic indicators.
Translated by Justyna Niedzielska
5 Gini’s coefficient (ranges from 0 to 1) is used to describe income inequalities. 
The lower value represents the smaller differences in the level of income.
